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Introduction

This book concerns two topics which we are told never to discuss in public:
religion and politics. I will deal with both here. The issue of political ethics
remains as controversial as it has in years past.

The labels "liberal" and

"conservative," both of which have taken on new meanings during the last
century, continue to evoke emotional responses from the opposite party. Political
theorists and philosophers, as well as legal philosophers, seem to advance
innovative theories about governmental authority, individual rights, and legal
theory at a rapid-fire pace. Most of these theories, though not all, are aimed at
justifying the ever-increasing sphere of governmental power and scope, though
some are equally determined to excise all government. The range of ideas as to
the role of government and law is breathtaking, along a spectrum from radical
libertarianism to various forms of socialism, most gradualistic but some not, and
on to anarchy. The vast bulk of modem theories of government would, it is fair to
say, include a generous role for government. I shall have more to say later on
political theory and Theonomy.
With regard to ethics, relativism of differing degrees has, in keeping with the
postmodern condition, carried the day. Social ethics have become simply what
the state says they should be, in accordance with the prevailing political
atmosphere and pragmatic considerations. At the popular level, the legal system
for many appears to have abandoned any semblance of reason or common sense.
The courts enforce laws that to many seem ludicrous at best. Legislative bodies at
all levels, in the estimation of many, busy themselves with new statutes that
encroach on the sphere of individual right and power, while at the same time they
spend greater amounts of taxpayer money collected from multiplying sources of
tax revenue and prolifically engage in self-enriching activities. Moreover there is

a growing perception that legislators are buying votes through profligate
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spending. Administrative agencies endlessly promulgate new rules, ostensibly to
implement statutes, but seeming on closer examination to have their own narrow
agenda Not only that, but such regulations have the force of law without the
benefit of representation. Laws themselves appear to exhibit increasingly tenuous
ties to traditional morality or ethics and in fact often contradict Judeo-Christian
principles. Those that do not are subject to the wrath of the courts. In the
meantime, reactions to these measures have ranged from throwing hands in the air
to bombing federal court buildings.
Where does that leave the Christian who is interested in the realm of political
ethics? Here too, the array of theories (and practices) is astounding, albeit a bit
narrower than generally. Some Christian political theorists assert that government
has no substantial authority beyond defense, criminal justice and the like, and will
be the first to insist on the right to drive at any speed they wish, simply because
the Bible grants no explicit authority to set speed limits. 1 Other Christians, near
the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum, and using the same Bible, though
interpreting it quite differently, have written about the sinfulness of money and of
incomes over a fixed amount, beyond which government should tax all of the
remainder and redistribute it to the needy.2 Finally, the vast middle either has
some combination of inconsistent ideas or has not the slightest clue, and often less
interest, about the nuances and implications of political and legal theory. Many
Christians are content to claim personal piety and leave politics to the pragmatists.
Some have no real Christian worldview of government and, at any rate, many
distrust any involvement in it because it is believed to be either evil or distracting
from the true mission in life-to win souls and wait for the rapture. 3 Others are
quite content practically to accept the new roles of government so long as the

1

This is of course but a single example.
This is the seeming logical conclusion of writers such as Ronald Sider, Rich Christians in an
Age of Hunger. InterVarsity, rev. and expanded, 1984, whose work elicited strong negative
response from Theonomists.
3
The latter group actually represents a fair number of evangelical Christians, who are partially
dispensationalist, but unaware of it, and also simply indifferent to the issues related to the state.
2

3

outcome benefits them. For all these sometimes diverse groups, the use of the
Old Testament law is problematic at best.
One of the most interesting but as yet not well-understood, and even less
respected, movements within the church of the late twentieth century and early
twenty-first century has been the so-called Theonomic movement or simply
Theonomy. A working definition of this movement would include the call of
Theonomists for the application of the Old Testament or Mosaic Law to the civil
realm so that what is punishable as crime or other civil offense in the Mosaic Law
ought to be similarly punishable by governments today through their judicial
systems. 4 Related to their legal theory is a theory of government in general: that
its scope and power must be limited to what the Scriptures of the Old Testament
(supplemented by the New) clearly command or what can be deduced from those
particulars.5 In other words, the entire Mosaic set of judicial laws, whether
proscriptive or prescriptive, is valid in exhaustive detail in modem society.
Though this movement is strongest among Reformed theologians, churchmen and
laypeople, it also finds adherents among other groups, including Baptists and even
Charismatics.
Theonomy is, to be sure, not a monolithic movement, and Theonomists
disagree among themselves over the precise way the Law is to be applied (and
understood). Nevertheless, one will find uniformity in that all Theonomists are
committed to the ideal of the use of the Law in a more or less literal and
exhaustive way in civil society.
As I stated above, Theonomy is often misunderstood. Even many scholars
have failed to grasp its subtleties. But Theonomists themselves as well as their
detractors have also failed to understand fully the historical origins and
4

A more detailed definition will be provided below. Theonomy will be distinguished from the
eschatological thought labeled Postmillennialism, though the two often (but not logically
necessarily) go together.
5
It will be important to stress the aspect of deducibility, since Theonornists realize that Scripture
requires application or implication and does not always address a given issue directly. But
deduction is merely drawing out what is implicitly (and logically) there in a given proposition.
See David Kelley, The Art of Reasoning, Third edition. Norton, 1998.

4

development of Theonomy. The movement is frequently thought to have arisen
in the 1960s and 1970s, paralleling a resurgence of conservative Reformed
thought and practice. 6 Some Theonomists themselves will trace their heritage to
men like John Calvin and John Knox and to the seventeenth-century English
Puritans and Scottish Presbyterians.7 Others see the movement's ideas as unique
and without substantial continuity with the past. 8 Whatever the case, there have
been no works which have attempted a full-scale examination of the roots,
transformations, and migrations of Theonomy from the early modem period to the
present day. It is the task of this work to attempt such a historical treatment,
beginning, somewhat arbitrarily, with John Calvin and John Knox and movingor rather skipping-through some four-hundred years to the late twentieth
century. As I trace the movement, it will not be my intent to attempt a criticism
of it, either for good or bad. My aim is to present accurately its development from
its early modem days. This also implies that Theonomy, defined broadly, was not
novel even in the days of John Calvin, as indeed it was not, especially when one
looks to the Old Testament records. But, it seems clear that Theonomy as we
know it today originated in at least one form in the early modem period, and on
that score, some of the Theonomists, I believe, have it partially right. We will
even be able to pinpoint the most Theonomic center of the early modem period to
some sixteenth century Reformers, to the Puritans and to Scottish Presbyterians of
the seventeenth century. As I said, many modem Theonomists have been quite
open in their admiration for Puritans and their Scottish brethren and if we were to
find their roots as they themselves see them, there is no question that those roots
would be in the nomism of various varieties of seventeenth century Puritanism, as

6

For example, the Presbyterian Church in America was formed in 1973 and contains a good
many Theonomists at present, as it did at its founding .
1
See R. J. Rushdoony, The Institutes of Biblical Law. Craig Press, 1973, especially the first few
rages.
Gary North has written that there was no Theonomic movement before the publication of
Rushdoony's Institutes of Biblical Law.
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well as to the sixteenth century. 9 Even those Theonomists who see the modem
Theonomic movement as essentially unique have found common ground with the
groups mentioned above.
Nevertheless, it remains to know how Theonomy became what it is today, the
process of its development over the centuries, even in those times when it might
have appeared to have died out as a movement. Implicit in the last statement is
my own thesis that, although Theonomy is in fact traceable in certain respects to
the early modem period, its development has not been one long and continuous
propagation without change over time.

Rather it bas undergone certain very

important modifications in the twentieth century-hence, we can speak of a
Theonomic movement beginning in the recent past. 10 I will label this movement
modem Theonomy, in contrast to its roots in the past. The modem Theonomists,
we will see, are at least partially neo-Puritan or Scottish Presbyterian in their own
perception of their movement. 11
Apart from its novelty I believe, this study will be important for others reasons.
First, it is a relevant issue in the churches. The initial burst of enthusiasm and
vitriolic for and against the movement has subsided somewhat since the 1970s
and 1980s. Nevertheless, the issue still arises frequently enough in written works,
especially by "secular" historians, and in ordination disputes, as well as other
settings, that it seems important to try to lay to rest the issue of Theonomy's
origins and development. 12 I do not pretend to be able to answer that question

9
See Ernest Kevan, The Grace of Law: A Study in Puritan Theology. Soli Deo Gloria Ministries
reprint, 1997, for a still useful examination of the range of Puritan views of the Mosaic law.
10
I do not wish to leave the impression that Theonomy cannot claim some writers of the past as
being very close at least to their twentieth century position.
11
It is not altogether clear that this self-characterization is strictly correct, though it will prove to
be partially accurate. In addition, Puritanism is not the only influence that helped constitute the
modern Theonomic movement.
12
I am not suggesting that all non-Christian historians have mischaracterized the movement, but
there is evidence of an incomplete understanding. On the other hand, self-consciously Christian
historians have failed to understand Theonomy fully. See for example, J. Ligon Duncan, ''Moses'
Law for Modern Government: The Intellectual and Sociological Origins of the Christian
Reconstructionist Movement," a paper presented to the Social Science History Association,
Atlanta, GA, USA (1994), and appearing in Premise 2, no. 5 (May, 1995), 4-19, who, despite an
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definitively, but I do hope to move everyone a bit closer to a resolution. I hope to
bring a good deal of light to the subject, instead of the frequent heat of the
continuing polemical battles.
In addition, this study, I believe, will have certain important, and helpful,

results for the movement itself. If I am right about my conclusions, that is, if I
have collected and interpreted my historical evidence correctly, the Theonomic
movement ought, for the sake of objectivity, to adopt a somewhat less ambitious
approach to its own pedigree.

This, coupled with a greater degree of

understanding of the movement by its critics, may help to diffuse the conflict
which has beset the Theonomic movement. It is true that I may find that I have
only helped to clarify the battle lines, but at least the truth, in some measure, will
be available to all.
Finally, a study of Theonomy is important for its relationship to other political
philosophies. Mainstream political theory has tended in recent decades-if not
centuries-to neglect religiously based political ideas. This is partly due to the
general intellectual climate and partly due to the impact of that climate upon the
discipline of political science and political theory themselves. The discussions
have centered around ideologies such as liberalism (classical and modern),
socialism, libertarianism, communitarianism and the like, as well as attention to
natural and positive law theories. In the political science discipline, empirical
endeavors have carried the day, sometimes to such an extent that theory has been
all but ignored. Political theology has been relegated to the arcane realms of the
history of political thought, but even here, the focus has been on republican forms
of government and law versus varieties of monarchism, or on the shift of natural
law to positive law, with only slight mention of the place of the Christian
Scriptures in the history of political thinking.

A study of Theonomy will, I

believe, bring theology back to its rightful place in political dialogue, even if
Theonomy itself proves unacceptable.
otherwise excellent descriptive article, tends to lump all Theonomists together (this in spite of his
argument to the contrary).
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I will follow an outline roughly like this. First, I will define Theonomy, and
this definition will include its various manifestations as seen in the works of the
respective factions of that movement.

Also included will be a thorough

examination of Theonomy's nature, particularly its constituent elements. Second,
and more to the purpose of the book, I will trace the history of Theonomy as a
movement. This means I will be concerned not only with Theonomy in the
abstract, but also as it has actually existed in time and among certain groups. Of
course, to see this, we must of necessity be selective in marshalling historical
evidence. Thus, the evidence will come from individuals who actually made their
views known in writing, men such as John Calvin, Martin Bucer, the Puritans,
Theodore Beza, Francis Turretin, Samuel Rutherford, then later Gary North,
Kenneth Gentry, R. J. Rushdoony, Gregory Bahnsen, and many others. This is
not say that, in their writings, all of these men actually used the term ''Theonomy''
as it is used to today. Moreover, this very fact will certainly cause some criticism
to arise, possibly rightly, that I am imposing a modern term on an older writer and
therefore "making" him what he in fact was not. I do intend to let the facts speak
for themselves, and I believe that when they do, these older writers will deserve
the label ''Theonornist." But, and this is crucial, we must ask whether every
figure examined will conform to what a contemporary Theonomist might wish or
believe. I said already that Theonomy as a movement was not monolithic. I add
here that it has never been monolithic in history. It is only unified in the "mind"
of God, but unfortunately, that mind is not always simple to interpret, as it is
written in the Bible. All Theonornists would make primary use of the Bible, but
they have not all understood it the same way. Theonomy therefore, then as now,
becomes in part, an issue of interpretation. In addition, we must address the
question, often raised, of whether certain views can even be legitimately labeled
as Theonomic.
In addition, I make a disclaimer at this point that this history is in a sense and

to an extent an older type, derisively labeled the "great man" approach.
Especially when dealing with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
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evidence "from below" is at best sparse and almost always non-existent.
Therefore, I am restricted to the "elites" and intellectuals, to their records left to
us because they were the ones who could read and write. Does this mean there
was no larger body of people we could call Theonomic? I do not think that this
question must be answered in the negative. In the cultures with which I am
dealing early on, the center of learning was tightly bound up with religion and
with the church. If ministers were the educated class and if they did form a
conscious Theonomic body of thought, even if in a minority, they would most
certainly have passed their ideas on to their congregations (we have evidence that
they did). So to rely on the elites is not necessarily to mischaracterize the extent
of Theonomy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of course, given the
much higher literacy rates in the twentieth century and the greater availability of
information in this technological era, it will be much easier to assess the extent of
Theonomy at the level of culture below the elite or intellectual level. 13
In developing the history of the movement, after a short introduction of the

thought of Thomas Aquinas and John Wyclif, I will concentrate on the sixteenth
century, particularly the work of John Calvin, John Knox and their Reformed
contemporaries and successors. It is tempting to look also, albeit briefly, at the
Lutherans, Anabaptists, and others. I will in fact give attention to Luther, the
Lutheran tradition and the Anabaptists. However, the bulk of this work will of
necessity focus on the Reformed tradition, including the English reformers such
as William Tyndale. It is to this Reformed tradition that the roots, in part, of
modem Theonomy may be traced. The following chapter will cover the crucial
period that includes the Puritans, Scottish Presbyterians, and Continental PostReformation Scholastics.

Here we will see the real flowering of a type of

Theonomy, not universal, but still real, that one could identify as at least similar
to contemporary Theonomy. Later chapters will pick up the story of Theonomy
13
Indeed, the era of the internet, to an extent much greater then the printing press, and combined
with higher literacy rates (though varying), has created a virtual cornucopia of information from
real and self-styled Theonomists.
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in the twentieth century, as it became a movement. The twentieth century is a
pivotal one, for it is here that the conservative Reformed thinkers began to put
forth Theonomy once again as a viable alternative to the political and social
philosophies of their day. It was also in this century that Theonomy experienced
a renaissance in popularity in the church at all levels. Theonomy was probably at
its strongest in the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries, but all these centuries
and periods are important for this history, in order to show the development of the
idea and the movement in an unbroken line and to indicate the main lines of
influence. Following chapters will address the modern Theonomy movement as it
has developed in all its interesting variations. But here also we will discuss the
"quasi-Theonomists" of the so-called "Christian Right," who in certain aspects
resembled Theonomists but, where they were aware of the movement, opposed
Theonomy or at least showed indifference to it.
Since Theonomy had its modern origins mainly in the seventeenth century
(and to a lesser extent in the sixteenth century), and its modem resurgence in the
twentieth century, obviously I will devote more attention to those periods. This
does not mean that I will slight the evidence of other periods, as it is crucial for
establishing the development of the movement. However, it is much easier to
find evidence from those centuries simply because so many individuals were
concerned with some form of Theonomy due to the issues of the relation of
church r d state, the relation of the individual to the state, and the discussions and
debates/regarding the powers and duties of the state. Much of the earliest debate
took place in turn in the context of the rise of the modern state, or, what we might
call the rise of the modern secular state. Many of the same issues are at the root
of the more recent Theonomic movement. Reformed Christians in particular,
with their tradition of suspicion of unlimited state power and limited
constitutional government, have written and spoken in opposition to what they
consider to be a usurpation by the state of the authority of God and His Law.
Their works range from polemical tracts and books at the popular level to quite
sophisticated philosophical, theological and biblical treatises on the role of the
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civil aspect of the Mosaic Law as well as the limits imposed by that Law on the
state. 14

Some of these works and their authors have gained almost a "cult

following," though such an assertion is not intended to denigrate their
sophistication or to detract from their possible value. At any rate, the point is that
the contemporary Theonomic writers are dealing with much the same set of
problems in a different historical context. 15
But it is worth reiterating that this work will also deal with more than those
who are strictly labeled Theonomists.

Many theological conservatives,

fundamentalists (to use this very misunderstood term), and others, while refusing
to be identified with Theonomy, for one reason or another, have adopted positions
with respect to the political and legal realm that place them in a category I have
already labeled "quasi-Theonomist."

These individuals and movements-the

Christian Right for example-are also important for this analysis, since we will
attempt to discern any conscious influence on them from Theonomy. But even
where they disavow Theonomy, insofar as they adopt Theonomic positions, they
have played an important role in propagating Theonomic ideas, to a greater extent
even than the Theonomic movement itself.

In addition, their responses and

reactions to the Theonomic movement will be important for our overall
understanding of the movement.
Definitions
The words ''Theonomy" or "Theonomist" were not used by those whose
views, in the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, resembled or matched
exactly, the ideas with which present day Theonomists describe themselves. Nor
did their detractors use that term of Theonomically oriented individuals of the
period from Calvin to the nineteenth century. I can find no reference to this term
at all, in the sense in which I am using it here, in the literature of the period before
the mid- to late twentieth century. The term has only been used to describe the
14
An example of a more sophisticated trealment would be Gregory Bahnsen, Theonomy in
Christian Ethics. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1977 ..
15
See Bahnsen, op. cit.
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ideas and the movement which I will elaborate below, in the late twentieth
century or to other uses made by theologians who would not have considered
themselves either Reformed or theologically conservative. 16 As to the origin of
the use of this term by modem Theonomists who are the subject of this book, only
apocryphal stories exist. It appears the term came into use quite naturally early
on, in contrast to the term "autonomy." 17
Nevertheless, especially since there existed individuals who did subscribe to
the same or a similar approach as present day Theonomists, it is important to
attempt to define this most "slippery" term, or, at least to provide a working
definition. Such definitions cannot hope to describe completely accurately the
thought of those of earlier centuries, especially given the different perspectives of
most modem Theonomists as compared to older writers and given the different
historical contexts. But a definition can give us some benchmark of comparison
to the present-day Theonomic movement.
As a preface to defining Theonomy, I will first discuss a crucial distinction
made by most modem Theonomists and frequently criticized by their detractors.
Theonomists, and also other theologians in the history of Christianity, have as rule
distinguished the Mosaic Law into parts or aspects. The corpus of that Law, as
contained in the Pentateuch, is almost universally divided by Theonomists into
two parts: (1) the moral commands; (2) the ceremonial commands associated with
the Old Testament sacrificial system. Within the moral law, Theonomists then
distinguish the moral aspects of the Mosaic Law and the judicial or civil aspects
or commands. The moral precepts are very general and summary commands
16
To be sure, Theonomy as a term has been used in other, very different, contexts in the
twentieth century. See Paul Tillich, Religiose Verwirklichung. Berlin: Furche, 1929, who
distinguishes between autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy, the latter which he defines as
"sharply distinguished from heteronomy, i. e., from the shattering of autonomously validated
forms of human thought and action by a law alien and external to the spirit Theonomy is in
contrast to heteronomy an imbuing of autonomous forms with transcendent import," quoted from
'Theonomie," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. by Hermann Gunkel et al.
Tubingen: Mohr, 1931 , Vol. V. See also James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich 's Philosophy of
Culture, Science, and Religion. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, 52-54, 60, 77-85.
17
The term "Reconstructionism" is said by some to have arisen in a conversation between Greg
Bahnsen and Gary North, and was finally settled on after ''Transfonnationism" was rejected.
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while the judicial precepts "specify the general precepts by way of illustrative
application .... " 18

This type of distinction is made because of an underlying

presupposition in modem Theonomy, that the judicial commands must still be
valid in a literalistic and comprehensive fashion, just as the moral precepts must
remain valid. This is a necessary proposition simply because for Theonomists,
God's nature is immutable. Therefore, his law cannot change in substance. In fact
the judicial laws flow from the moral laws. J. Ligon Duncan has noted that this
linking of the judicial and moral commands has made it logically impossible to
deny the continuing validity of the judicial code if one accepts the validity of the
moral commands.19
To be sure, many theologians and churchmen have posited a three-fold
division of the Mosaic Law: moral, ceremonial and judicial commands. 20 But this
is really no different from the two-fold distinction with its two-fold subdivision,
except that it may more easily justify a discarding of the judicial laws if they are
not specifically connected to the immutable moral laws.
The moral commandments consist of those parts of the Mosaic Law which
have universal and timeless force, as they reflect the nature and attributes of God
Himself.

Examples include commands regarding idolatry, stealing, murder,

blasphemy, and adultery. These commands are considered always to be sin, but
not necessarily criminal or civil violations. In every instance of a violation of a
moral command, the church has the duty to deal with that sin in some way, but the
government does not have this duty in each and every such case (though it
certainly would much of the time).
Ceremonial commands are those which are related to the sacrificial system of
the Old Testament or to the consecration of the Hebrew people as "holy" and
therefore separated from the surrounding peoples after the Exodus.
18

Such

See Ibid.,
See Duncan, "Moses' Law for Modern Government," in Premise, op. cit., 14 (p. IO of the
internet version). But some Theonomists do make a tripartite distinction.
20
See the Westminster Confession of Faith (1648), Chapter XIX of the original English edition,
the Scottish edition and the various editions of Presbyterian churches.
19
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commands are not considered timeless.

In fact, they would be considered

legalistic, in the technical sense of that term, if enforced today, either by the
church or the state.

Examples of ceremonial commandments include all

sacrifices, as well the Sabbath on Saturday (a distinctly Jewish aspect of the Law).
The reason these rules are considered ceremonial and therefore unenforceable or
non-normative is because of their intent to point forward to the coming of Jesus
Christ. They are therefore "types" of Christ. But when Jesus Christ came, these
commands became unnecessary because of Jesus' perfect and once-for-all
sacrifice rendering any repeated sacrifices null.

One may, according to the

Theonomist, look to the Letter to the Hebrews to find support for this position.
Theonomists will sometimes exercise caution on this issue, since they must also
reconcile their notion of the role of a ceremonial command with Jesus'
programmatic statement in Matthew 5: 17 that he had not come to abolish the
Law of the Prophets but to "fulfill."21 Moreover, some ceremonial regulations
overlapped with moral regulations and a given law could have aspects of each.
Thus, the ceremonial aspect would drop away while the moral aspect continued
unaffected. In some instances it could then be argued that the moral command
had a judicial component, for example, the enforcement of the Sabbath Day or
Sunday by the magistrate as a day on which unnecessary economic activities must
cease.
Finally, a judicial or civil commandment or regulation is generally defined by
Theonomists as one which is bound up in the government of a nation, specifically
the government established by God for the Commonwealth of Israel by the
Mosaic Law. This does not imply that the Mosaic judicial laws are confined to
historical Israel. As we will see, they are valid and binding for the duration of the
earth's existence.

Judicial regulations include laws against murder, theft,

adultery, homosexual practice, open rebellion of children against parents, and
many other prohibitions, as well as laws prescribing the care of property owners
21

Examples abound, however, of incautious language to the effect that Jesus did in fact abolish
the Law by his coming.
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in providing for safety of those who might visit them, and other similar
regulations. These laws also include the particular establishment of the specific
structures of government and

the economic

system of the

Hebrew

Commonwealth, even though most (not all) of these rules are not in the form of
law but in narrative form.22 These regulations are a kind of "case law," in that
they represent individually examples of a more general principle which is moral
in nature. In each of these instances, the Theonomist argues, a violation of that
law is, besides being a sin, also punishable by the government as an offense.
Specific punishments are a matter of debate among Theonomists, but in general,
most would tend to call for a punishment similar to or exactly like that prescribed
in the Bible. Therefore, murder, adultery, homosexual behavior, and many other
crimes would be punished by the death penalty, while others would require
restitution.23

But, as I have noted above, the modem Theonomist does not

technically separate the moral and judicial laws, though he must be able to do so
logically in order to discuss them.

I will not emphasize this difference of

distinction between many Theonomists and traditional Reformed theology (and
non-Reformed doctrine also), but it should be borne in mind as crucial to the
modem Tbeonomist's argument for the continuing validity of the judicial
precepts. My focus will be on the evidence for continuing validity, and so I will
only touch incidentally on the differences in classification.24
Our definition of Theonomy then asserts that all the law of God is valid for and
binding on modem man and culture in exhaustive detail.25 This includes moral,
ceremonial and judicial or civil laws. Not all laws, however, are valid in the same

22
For a modern Theonomist, the form of government and economics for the nation-state of the
Jews still represents part of the total Theonomic system since the narrative becomes normative
because the particular form or forms express God' s nature. God would not establish a
representative government unless he wanted that form and he wanted that specific form because it
somehow reflected His own nature.
23
The evidence for these disagreements will be presented below, and in its historical context.
See below for more on this issue.
2A This is not to say the differences are not important, but historically, the real issue, I am
convinced is whether the judicial laws are in fact still valid in civil society.
2S See Greg Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, op. cit., 45.
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way. Moral commands are eternally valid for the personal and inner life. They
are related to sanctification.

Ceremonial laws are not literally valid but

typologically valid. They function to point to Christ or to set a people apart from
the surrounding secular cultures. Judicial laws are valid in exhaustive detail.
This means that even the "case laws" of the Old Testament remain binding and
valid for the magistrate. 26 These judicial laws are the focus of this work. It is
possible to define Theonomy in terms of all the types of laws in the Old
Testament. However the usual understanding of the term limits it to the problem
of the validity of the judicial laws. I will therefore use the term to refer only to
the use and validity of the judicial laws.
It is perhaps obvious, but nevertheless crucial, to understand the basis on

which Theonomists rest their theory of law. Generally, they appeal strictly to
Scripture and from logical deductions properly made from it as the foundation and
source of their legal system.27 Appeals to natural law are viewed with a great deal
of suspicion, though we will see that Calvin was somewhat ambiguous on this
point. 28 Appeals to positive law are viewed with outright disdain by Theonomists,
since they argue that pos~tive law has increasingly become an arbitrary exercise of
"raw" governmental power designed to foster unbiblical aims. This is not to say
that all so-called positive law is inconsistent with biblical law, since a great deal
of the Western legal system is rooted in biblical principles.

However, the

Theonomist would assert that, as the state increasingly discarded its Christian
principles, separating more and more from religion, it correspondingly adopted
laws that had little or no basis in biblical law and which often ran counter to it.
What little of the biblical tradition is left is itself being overwhelmed first by the
pragmatist school of legal thought and second, more recently, by the postmodern
or legal deconstructionist approach to law. This is not to say that Western law
does not still contain a great deal of the Old Testament law embedded in it in
26

See Ibid.
See Ibid.
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Ford Lewis Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960.
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principle. One sees examples in criminal law, tort and cotract law and in the very
structure of the United States Constitution which in certain aspects is grounded in
understandings of governmental structure of the Hebrew Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, these older principles are quickly being abandoned in the newer
expressions of law and the theories underlying them.
Another point to stress, which has already been raised, is that for many of the
regulations of the Mosaic law, there is a double aspect. For example, murder is
both a moral and a civil violation of the Mosaic Law. The Sabbath, according to
many Reformed writers (and others), partakes of both a ceremonial aspect, the
actual day as well as what is done, and a moral aspect, the timeless principle that
the day of the Lord ought to be honored and kept. 29 The sin of theft, which by the
way is defined somewhat broadly by Theonomists, is also a criminal offense,
punishable by restitution but not with a jail sentence. Another distinction must be
made at this point between what the Old Testament Law actually states and how
Theonomists interpret this Mosaic Law. I will leave this discussion for later
except to say that in general Theonomists tend to interpret the Mosaic regulations
still in force rather strictly and are willing to make broad application of them. In
addition, if it was not already clear, the Theonomists, as distinguished from other
groups, for example, classical dispensationalists and certain Reformed writers, do
assert the continuing validity of the civil aspects of the Mosaic Law in the realm
of social ethics and political economy.
It should be mentioned that not a few scholars, as we shall see, have taken
issue with the traditional division of the Mosaic Law.

Some argue that this

division is arbitrary, without any real basis in Scripture itself. They continue,
arguing that Scripture never makes any such explicit division and this silence
would militate against the traditional division. Moreover, at the practical level,
determining which command or regulation fits which category is at times virtually
impossible. How does one classify the offense of theft or murder or abortion or
29
On this particular regulation, one of the Ten Commandments, see Joseph Pipa, The Lord's
Day, op. cit.
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homosexual practice? Some offenses might fit under all three categories. In
fairness, it must be added that the Theonomist would allow for this overlap,
usually by examining components of a given regulation and then classifying the
regulation according to its particular components. For example, the Sabbath can
be resolved into a ceremonial component-the particular day and its particular
activities-and a moral component-the principles of the day as devoted wholly
to God in worship. 30 But, on the other hand, criticisms have also been leveled at
the Theonomist two-fold distinction in the law. It too is considered arbitrary and
not rooted in the Bible, the very work to which Theonomists appeal for their
31

ideas.

Finally, with respect to the laws subsumed under the term Theonomy, as here
used, I have already briefly mentioned that Theonomists also include in their
system of laws the principles related to the structure of government for a nationstate and the economic structure for that state. This inclusion raises an immediate
potential problem.

The Old Testament does not explicitly state laws for the

structure of government or the type of economic system.

It does provide a

narrative account of how and why God did establish the Hebrew government the
way he did (for example, Moses' appointment of representatives, who governed
sub-groups of the total population). It also gives specific laws that, if collated,
could provide a total governmental and economic system (for example, the
prohibition against stealing creates the legal foundation for property rights which
in turn creates a necessary pre-condition for a market economy). Theonomists
have side-stepped this problem by arguing that God would not have established a
particular form of government or issued particular commands unless he desired a
specific political and economic structure. This structure must therefore reflect his
own nature and must be normative (assuming appropriate interpretation of the Old
Testament). In addition, Theonomists rely heavily on the reverse argument from

30
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silence-if there is not explicit command or fair deduction from a command, the
action is prohibited. Since there is no command to establish a socialist economic
system and not even any (or many) laws conducive to such a system, any form
contrary to some republican and market form must be forbidden as a violation of
the Mosaic Law.
Theonomy also has to be distinguished from a related but not equivalent
movement

known

as

Reconstructionism

or

Dominion

Theology. 32

Reconstructionism begins with the optimistic notion that God will, through His
church, cause Christians to take dominion of the structures of the world and begin
the movement toward the postmillennial kingdom. In fact, the kingdom of God is
being ushered in, the Reconstructionist argues, with each small or large advance
of the Christian world view agenda in the world. It will someday be consummated
with the second coming of the Lord. 33 It is important to understand that for the
Reconstructionist the kingdom is not brought about by force. God works in
history to bring more and more individuals to faith in Jesus Christ and to
submission to His will in all things, including political and legal structures. As a
result over time the Mosaic civil law will be incorporated into the legal system as
part of an overall systemic change. But this change is gradual and accomplished
ultimately by God. As one can see, Reconstructionism represents a variant of
postmillennial eschatology. In addition, it follows that one can logically be a
Theonomist without being a Reconstructionist, although this is relatively rare, 34
but one cannot be a Reconstructionist without being a Theonomist also, unless he

32
On this movement, see Gary North, Tools of Dominion: The Case Laws of Exodus. Tyler,
Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1990, who weds Theonomy with Dominion Theology.
See also david Chilton, Paradise Restored: A Biblical Theology of Dominion. Tyler, Texas:
Reconstruction Press, 1985. For a critique of Dominion Theology, see Bruce Barron, Heaven on
Earth? The Social and Political Agendas of Dominion Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan 1992.
Barron comes very close to confusing Reconstructionism with Theonomy.
33
Theologically this is a postmillennial eschatology, but not a secular postmillennialism. See
Hans Schwarz, Eschatology. Eerdmans, 2000, p. 332.
34
Theonornists as a rule reject the possibility of holding a Theonomic view without holding to
postmillennialism. But some have attempted this, for example, Thomas Ice, who at one time
considered himself a Theonomist Interview with Thomas Ice, August 3, 2005, Lynchburg,
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is illogical. Writers on the Theonomic movement have often confused Theonomy
with Reconstructionism, although this confusion is understandable. I will hope to
avoid such a mistake, but on the other hand I do recognize that the term is
frequently used in the place of Theonomy and conveys some of the broader
context for the narrower movement.
I must also mention one more issue regarding the two-fold or three-fold
division of the Law as it is used today by Theonomists. It will suffice to say that
this division is universally assumed and not proven by any writer I have
examined. I am not implying that such an assumption is right or wrong. I am
merely stating the adoption of such a division by Theonomists (and many
Reformed writers) as a presupposition, which, apparently, needs no proof and
which is self-evident. As we will see, the traditional Reformed division of the law
is three-fold, moral, ceremonial and judicial, or two-fold. 35
This brings us to a closer examination of the definition of Theonomy.
Theonomy is a movement with historical roots in the Reformation and PostReformation periods, which asserts the primacy, ultimacy, and exclusivity of the
Mosaic Law in social ethics. More specifically, it is the use of the civil or judicial
aspect of the Mosaic Law that is asserted by the Theonomist. To put it another
way, the Theonomist would assert that there are in reality only two sources of
law: autonomous man and infallible Scripture from God.

It is self-evident,

according to their thought, that God' s law must be superior, in the sense of
mutually exclusive in relation to the positive law of man. In addition, modern
Theonomists insist that the civil laws must be used as they were used in the Old
Testament (assuming we know exactly how they were actually implemented). In
other words, a given regulation must be defined as closely as possible in its
context, and then brought forward and applied to the modern context exactly as it
was in the Mosaic economy, including the punishment. To be sure, Theonomists

35

See the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XIX (see below). Some older writers have
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do not agree among themselves regarding implementation or even interpretation,
but they all hold to the essential necessity of the validity and use of the judicial
laws in modern society. This sounds quite simple, allowing for the disagreements
among Theonomists, but we may ask here, whether the development of such an
idea always been this relatively simple? Did John Calvin hold essentially the
same views regarding the judicial laws as modern Theonomists? Did the Puritans
differ from Calvin and the early Calvinists?

In part, these initial questions

hearken back to a more general question often asked by scholars of this era: Was
Calvin a Calvinist?
followers.

But the questions are not exhausted by Calvin and his

What did the Zwinglians think?

What was the view of the

Anabaptists? Even more importantly, can we trace lines of influence from this
early modern period through time to present-day Theonomists? To put it another
way, where exactly did modem Theonomists derive their basic ideas regarding the
judicial laws?

We may be tempted to answer this question immediately by

invoking the name of John Calvin. But the answer may be more complex, or
simpler, than that if one posits the primary influence on modem Theonomy as the
Bible, even considering the clear influence of the Puritan movement or the
particular biblical hermeneutic of the modem Theonomists.
Theonomy is also defined in terms of ethics and is always connected to ethics
for modem Theonomists. 36 Theonorny, as defined here, is in fact political ethics.
Ethics is of course a branch of philosophy concerned with right and wrong in
various contexts.37 In the context of the political realm or the realm of political
economy, ethics is concerned not only with the behavior of individual
political/economic actors, but also with broader "structural" rules for the
establishment of governments, the limitations of the power of those governments,
the particular structure of governments (separation of powers, etc.), and so on.
Theonomy then is rooted in a particular set of ethical principles-the Scriptures of
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the Old Testament supplemented by the New Testament.

It is an absolutist

philosophy as opposed to an empirical or behavioristic approach.38 But it is by no
means impractical.

Theonomists insist that the Old Testament law must be

applicable in modem culture, as all of the Christian Scriptures must be.
There is a danger in proposing the definition of Theonomy which I have used
above. That danger is a type of historical fallacy which defines its object of study
by modem standards and then superimposes that definition on all past events,
sometimes guaranteeing that the researcher will find what he is looking for.
Another result of this fallacy is that the past cannot be allowed to speak for itself
and in its own terms. For example, was it really possible to find any Theonomists

in earlier centuries, given their own unique historical situation?39 Moreover, if
one were a Theonornist today, could he legitimately pass judgment on that
situation?

Perhaps, to some degree, the approach I have taken, to define

Theonomy in modem terms, is unavoidable, since at least some Theonomists
seem to wish to find antecedents in the past for their ideas. Thus, they too may in
some instances have committed a fallacy.

However, because the modem

Theonomist does define his ideas the way he does and then applies them to
individuals in previous centuries in order to find pronornians (protoTheonomists), then I am compelled to adopt his definition in order to determine
whether those he claims as Theonornists can in fact legitimately be classified as
such in terms of the modem definition. In doing so, I do not believe I am
prejudicing those of the past by forcing them to be Theonomists. I will, as a
historian should, allow them to speak in their own words, and then, using the
modem definition, make the determination of whether they can be considered to
be Theonomists as defined by the modem movement.
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One objection to my definition of modem Theonomy is that it reflects only one
group among many, even a minority viewpoint, and therefore is misleading. As
we will see many organizations outside the Theonomic camp have characterized
the ideas of the movement quite differently, much more radically. In addition,
there is ample evidence to indicate that Theonomy-like any movement-has
"fringe" elements. Do those elements taken together constitute a majority of selfdescribed Theonomists? If so, does that fact negate any mainstream definition?
This is not the place to elaborate beyond saying that I believe the data will show
that we can speak meaningfully of a mainstream Theonomic movement which
may be defined as I have done above. That fact does not minimize the existence
of more radical elements, which will also be considered.

But these various

individuals and factions do not make up the majority of the movement.

Church-State Relations and the Theonomic Movement

A clear understanding of the Theonomic movement and its history would not
be possible without also grasping at least the fundamental issues in history
regarding the relation between the church and the state. If, as Theonomists insist,
government ought to be organized and structured along Old Testament lines, then,
by definition, there must exist some sort of connection between the church, which
proclaims this law as valid, and the nation-state, which would adopt and enact the
laws advocated by the Theonomists. Of course, the relation between church and
state, merely at the level of political power, has been long and stormy, going all
the way back to the era of Constantine.40 I cannot possibly survey the intricacies
of that history. Rather I will be indirectly concerned with the relation of the
church and the state in terms of the willingness and capacity of government to
implement the Mosaic judicial laws.
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In the early modem period, where our study begins, the problem of a

"separation of church and state" in a secular sense was no issue at all. While the
church as an institution might be formally separate from the state, as it is in most
modem nation-states, the essential presuppositions governing law, political
theory, and economics were religious.41 Rulers might be secular in many respects
and even pagan in behavior, but the laws governing the state and individual
behavior were subject to criticism and censure by the church (the Roman Catholic
or Eastern Orthodox Churches). The basic notion was of a corpus Christianum,
that is, the notion that one was a member simultaneously of a nation-state and the
church, but without significant degree of separation of the two entities. The state
was a "Christian commonwealth.'.42 The ideal was the comprehensive Christian
state, ruled either by a single secular ruler whose allegiance was to the church or
by a pope as simultaneously an ecclesiastical and secular ruler.

When the

Protestant Reformation took root in parts of Europe, the church-state picture
became much more confused, adding to the already problematic "paradigm shifts"
in science and philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems that the ideal among the most
Reformed thinkers was that a government and its laws ought in some way and to
some extent, reflect God's law as that was understood by the Protestants. In this
way, the "mainstream" Reformation preserved a fragmented version of the corpus
Christianum. Lutherans, Zwinglians and Calvinists all sought to wed church to

state in such a way that the state would enforce the laws the church deemed
appropriate from its interpretation of Scripture.

History students everywhere

know of the alignments and re-alignments that took place after the Reformation
had begun, and which were partly responsible for the wars of religion lasting from
the mid-1500s almost continuously to around 1648.43 Students are also quite
41
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aware of the upheavals in England, whose own unique Reformation was certainly
as much political as religious, which lasted well past the initial Reformation
impetus. 44
The political rule of the Reformation era was that the one who ruled a given
region determined that region's religion. 45 In Reformed regions, including many
city-states, this rule was not just an excuse for the ruler or rulers to impose an
arbitrary set of laws on the people.

Rather Calvinist or Reformed political

thought lent itself to a total worldview that included the political sphere. In light
of this tendency, it is not at all surprising that we should see the issue of a biblical
government versus an arbitrary government arise. Reformed areas began to restructure their whole way of life, including the life of the state, so that all of life
conformed to a Christian worldview. 46 But, what would such a worldview look
like?

Was it as simple as adopting literally the Old Testament structure of

government and system of law?

Or were there still reservations, rooted in

theology, about such a wholesale change? We shall be exploring this problem as
we examine the existence (or non-existence) of Theonomic systems of law and
government in the early modem era

44

On the situation in England in relation to toleration, see W. K. Jordan, The Development of
Religious Toleration in England, 4 vols. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1965 and Ibid.
The Latin phrase was cuius regio, eius religio, used to summarize the Peace of Augsburg, but

45

not apparently invented until the seventeenth century.
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